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Section Three: Requirements for Technical Security, Services, and Mechanisms
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tableofcontents.htm   start.htm   securitysectiontwo.htm   securitysectionthree.htm   securitysectionone.htm   securitycategories.htm   references.htm   privacysectiontwo.htm   privacysectionthree.htm   privacysectionone.htm   privacysectionfour.htm   privacysectionfive.htm   privacycategories.htm   jobdescriptions.htm   introduction.htm   index.htm   hipaatrifold.htm   hipaasuppliment.htm   hipaaresources.htm   hipaaexecsummary.htm   guidelinesorganization.htm   generalpolicyguidelines.htm   generalcategories.htm   definitions.htm   contractsandpolicies.htm   contact.htm   amchipaasecurityandprivacyguidelines.htm   acronyms.htm   acknowledgements.htm  

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SEC.19
Access Control § .308(c)(1)(i)
HIPAA Requirement
The technical security services must include...Access control that includes:
(A) A procedure for emergency access (documented instructions for obtaining
necessary information during a crisis) and
(B) At least one of the following implementation features:
1) context-based access (an access control procedure based on the context of a
transaction as opposed to being based on attributes of the initiator or target)
2) role-based access
3) user-based access
(C) The optional use of encryption
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
Each covered entity is required to maintain a mechanism for access control that restricts access
to resources and allows access only by privileged entities, providing access only to those
workforce members with a business need for it. Possible types of access control include
mandatory access control, discretionary access control, time-of-day, classification, and subject-
object separation. In addition, a mechanism to enable emergency access is required.
Key Issues
Is there a documented procedure for emergency access?
Is there a process for screening unwarranted demands for access?
Do systems and applications have technical capability to implement user, role, or context-
based access?
Do systems prohibit or allow simultaneous access of the same user id/concurrent
connections? Why or why not?
Does the organization allow group, shared, trusted, or generic logon?
How does encryption impact access control?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
Define a context-based, role-based, and/or user-based access policy as appropriate for
each of the various situations in the covered entity and adopt implementation procedures
to enforce need-to-know accordingly.
Enact a clearly stated and widely understood "break the glass" procedure for allowing
access via alternate and/or manual methods in the event of an emergency requiring access
to protected health information.
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
Establish a centrally administered service to define access profiles-context-based, role-
based, or user-based-and oversee consistent implementation of access control
mechanisms.
Document and test the emergency access procedure.

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Evaluate information technology projects, proposals, contracts, and existing services for
access control features and implementation.
Consider adopting ASTM-defined healthcare roles.
Roadblocks
Centrally administered access control services are difficult to implement in the diverse IT
environments typical of Academic Medical Centers. Take into consideration that reduced logon
solutions, PKI, Kerberos, password brokering services, and the like are expensive, complicated,
and often require expertise not found in the healthcare industry. Testing emergency access
procedures in a realistic fashion is often cumbersome. Controlling contractor and business
partner access is challenging, particularly when remote network connections are involved and
accountability is necessary on the remote end. Modifying access profiles when staff change
roles within the covered entity will require efficient communication between personnel and IT.
Comments
Also see: SEC.05 Information Access and Control, SEC.10 Security Management Process, and
SEC.11 Termination Procedures
A user-based access model would require the organization to determine appropriate access for
each individual user. A role-based access model would require the organization to develop an
access profile for each role; for example, nurses, doctors, and desk attendants each have different
access needs dependent upon their role in the organization. A context-based access model
would, for example, allow all staff working in Endocrinology to access Endocrinology records.
Some AMCs may choose to implement combinations of access models.

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SEC.20
Audit Controls § .308(c)(1)(ii)
HIPAA Requirement
The technical security services must include...(mechanisms employed to record
and examine system activity).
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
System activity logging is required in order to recreate pertinent system events and actions taken
by system users and administrators. An audit process of examining logged information is
required in order to identify questionable data access activities, investigate breaches, respond to
potential weaknesses, and assess the security program.
Key Issues
What activities need to be monitored?
What level of logging detail is necessary?
How long should covered entities retain audit log data?
How should covered entities protect audit log data?
Who may access audit log data?
How can a covered entity identify inappropriate access?
How can a covered entity best use audit tools to assess its security program?
When should prospective audits be used?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
Employ event logging on systems that process or store protected health information
where warranted by risk analysis.
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
Log system administration events:
Creation and removal of accounts;
Assigning and changing of privileges;
Installation, maintenance, and changing of software;
Changes in hardware configurations.
Log user activities:
Logon and logoff, both successful and unsuccessful;
Read, write, create, and delete actions at the file level;
Individual user access to individual patient records;
Attempts to access unauthorized data and/or services.
Perform prospective audits of user activity where risk levels warrant.
Maintain log data for a specified period of time.
Protect system logs, especially those containing personally identifiable healthcare
information, from unauthorized access or alteration.
Employ audit reduction tools and/or "intelligent" methods of correlating log data to
detect unauthorized activity and reduce volumes to manageable size.

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Roadblocks
Be aware that system audit logs can quickly become voluminous and require additional
maintenance time. Prospective auditing and determining appropriateness of access and actions
taken is an expensive, time consuming, and difficult process.
Comments
The purpose of system event logging is to be able to recreate pertinent events should a security
violation or compromise occur. Log data is typically examined reactively, when indications of
unauthorized activity are reported. How entities interpret and respond to findings is a measure of
compliance. Because prospective audits are onerous and usually require the input of clinicians to
resolve need-to-know issues, they should be performed sparingly and with good cause in
accordance with risk and threat levels as determined through the risk analysis process.
Enterprise systems are normally subject to audit controls. Departmental systems and those with
limited numbers of users and lower functionality, such as laboratory systems or those that feed
data up to enterprise systems, are normally not subject to audit controls unless the risk analysis
process determines otherwise. The risk analysis process should consider track records of
violations. Logging and audit strategies should reflect levels of abuse. Logging to a high level
of detail, such as individual keystroke capture, is generally not necessary.
The required retention period for audit log data may vary. In general, at least several months of
data are necessary to adequately investigate instances of inappropriate access. The National
Industrial Security Program, which oversees the protection of U.S. government classified
information, requires at least six months of log data. This may be a reasonable and defensible
goal for Academic Medical Centers as well.
Also see: SEC.06 Internal Audit, SEC.09 Security Incident Procedures, PRIV.53 Complaints,
and PRIV.54 Sanctions.

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SEC.21
Authorization Control § .308 (c)(3)
HIPAA Requirement
...(the mechanism for obtaining consent for the use and disclosure of health
information) that includes at least one of the following implementation features:
(A) Role-based access
(B) User-based access
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
Covered entities must implement a mechanism to authorize the privileged use of protected health
information available via systems and applications. The mechanism must limit these privileges
to the maximum practical extent commensurate with professional needs.
Key Issues
How can a covered entity determine which type of authorization mechanism-role-based
or user-based-is appropriate?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
Employ a system or application-based mechanism to authorize activities within system
resources in accordance with the Least Privilege Principle. (See Comments.)
Implement:
A role-based mechanism where users with common information needs are provided
access and privileges through common security authorization classes; or
A user-based mechanism where users' information access and privilege needs are
determined and provided on an individual basis.
Maintain individual accountability for actions taken by forbidding group (shared, generic,
trusted, etc.) logons.
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
None.
Roadblocks
Implementing a data stewardship model is prudent but will likely be difficult in large covered
entities. Individuals or groups sometimes perform stewardship functions but may not understand
the concept of accountability for usage and disclosure.
Comments
The Least Privilege Principle pertains to one's ability to perform specified system functions.
Users should not have system capabilities not required of their positions. For example, a user
who requires only read access to medical information should not have the ability to change or
delete it. AMCs will almost certainly use the role-based authorization approach given the large
numbers of users typical of these organizations. Covered entities are cautioned to avoid
developing too many authorization profiles in a role-based model, as management of a large
number of profiles is unwieldy.

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SEC.22
Data Authentication § .308 (c)(4)
HIPAA Requirement
...(The corroboration that data has not been altered or destroyed in an
unauthorized manner. Examples of how data corroboration may be assured
include the use of a check sum, double keying, a message authentication code, or
digital signature.)
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
Each covered entity must be able to provide corroboration that protected health information in its
possession has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. Data corroboration
methods include, but are not limited to, the use of checksums, double keying, message
authentication codes, and digital signatures.
Key Issues
Is the use of digital signatures a cost effective approach?
Are technical integrity controls a reasonable expectation for more than certain critical
functions?
Can trusted procedures supplant technical controls in some respects?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
Employ technical controls such as checksums, digital signatures, double keying, and
message authentication codes where feasible and appropriate to the level of risk.
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
Employ technical integrity controls for critical automated functions such as physicians'
orders and prescriptions.
Procedural aspects closely related to technical authentication and integrity:
Maintain separation of duties. Avoid overlapping responsibilities of application and
system programmers, data center operators, data base administrators, network
operations, and user functions.
Establish and demonstrate change management discipline.
Roadblocks
No roadblocks specific to this point.
Comments
None.

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SEC.23
Entity Authentication § .308 (c)(5)
HIPAA Requirement
...(the corroboration that an entity is the one claimed) that includes:
(A) Automatic logoff (a security procedure that causes an electronic session to
terminate after a predetermined time of inactivity, such as 15 minutes), and
(B) Unique user identifier (a combination name/number assigned and maintained
in security procedures for identifying and tracking individual user identity).
(C) At least one of the following implementation features:
(1) Biometric identification (an identification system that identifies a human from
a measurement of a physical feature or repeatable action of the individual (for
example, hand geometry, retinal scan, iris scan, fingerprint patterns, facial
characteristics, DNA sequence characteristics, voice prints, and handwritten
signature)).
(2) Password.
(3) Personal identification number (PIN) (a number or code assigned to an
individual and used to provide verification of identity).
(4) A telephone callback procedure (method of authenticating the identity of the
receiver and sender of information through a series of ``questions'' and
``answers'' sent back and forth establishing the identity of each). For example,
when the communicating systems exchange a series of identification codes as part
of the initiation of a session to exchange information, or when a host computer
disconnects the initial session before the authentication is complete, and the host
calls the user back to establish a session at a predetermined telephone number.
(5) Token.
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
Entities (an entity may be a person, system, or process) must be authenticated prior to accessing
protected health information. Authentication is the process of corroborating that an entity is who
or what it claims to be; it may occur through a trusted process such as the provision of a secret
password, a personal identification number, or a token. Dial-up remote access users are subject
to stronger, or two-tiered, authentication that may include telephone call-back or other strong
authentication methods. Automatic log offs, or inactivity time-outs, can help enforce
authentication by precluding others from accessing unattended sessions.
Key Issues
Is a unique user ID with password authentication secure enough?
Should alternative authentication methods such as biometrics be considered?
What standards are necessary to make a public key infrastructure (PKI) interoperable and
truly useful?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
Uniquely identify each user and authenticate identity.
Implement at least one of the following methods to authenticate a user:

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Password;
Biometrics;
Personal Identification Number (PIN);
Physical token;
Call-back or strong authentication for dial-up remote access users.
Implement automatic log-offs to terminate sessions after set periods of inactivity.
Determine appropriate periods based on the levels of risk and exposure.
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
Include procedures for initiating user access, resetting passwords/tokens, and providing
administrative access in the authentication system, and ensure it is fully documented.
Employ a formal risk management methodology to identify risks and threats to the
authentication process.
Employ secure architectures, where risk appropriate, to authenticate entities. These may
include Kerberos, RADIUS, TACACS, PKI, or similar methods.
Encrypt hard-coded passwords that reside on client machines or in applications.
Securely authenticate contractors. Device-to-device or firewall-to-firewall authentication
is acceptable provided the contractor demonstrates individual accountability for access.
Change passwords periodically.
Specify time-out intervals based on business need and levels of risk and exposure.
Allow users to select and change their own passwords.
Roadblocks
No roadblocks specific to this point.
Comments
Dial-back has been largely replaced by more robust architectures such as Remote Dial-In User
Authentication (RADIUS). Most covered entities will continue to employ user ID and password
authentication. Managed properly this is adequate, but processing speeds and wide availability
of hacker tools and techniques have made this method obsolete for all but internal authentication.
Inactivity time-outs are secondary controls and users should not rely on them to end their
sessions. Password standards must be risk appropriate. Covered entities will need to address
password length, complexity, change frequency, user selection, etc. This will continue to be a
moving target.

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SEC.24
Communications/network controls § .308(d)
HIPAA Requirement
(1) If an entity uses communications or network controls, its security standards
for technical security mechanisms must include the following:
(i) The following implementation features:
(A) Integrity controls (a security mechanism employed to ensure the validity of the
information being electronically transmitted or stored).
(B) Message authentication (ensuring, typically with a message authentication
code, that a message received (usually via a network) matches the message sent).
(ii) One of the following implementation features:
(A) Access controls (protection of sensitive communications transmissions over
open or private networks so that they cannot be easily intercepted and interpreted
by parties other than the intended recipient).
(B) Encryption.
(2) If an entity uses network controls (to protect sensitive communication that is
transmitted electronically over open networks so that it cannot be easily
intercepted and interpreted by parties other than the intended recipient), its
technical security mechanisms must include all of the following implementation
features:
(i) Alarm. (In communication systems, any device that can sense an abnormal
condition within the system and provide, either locally or remotely, a signal
indicating the presence of the abnormality. The signal may be in any desired form
ranging from a simple contact closure (or opening) to a time-phased automatic
shutdown and restart cycle.)
(ii) Audit trail (the data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security
audit).
(iii) Entity authentication (a communications or network mechanism to irrefutably
identify authorized users, programs, and processes and to deny access to
unauthorized users, programs, and processes).
(iv) Event reporting (a network message indicating operational irregularities in
physical elements of a network or a response to the occurrence of a significant
task, typically the completion of a request for information).
AMC Explanation of HIPAA Regulation
Covered entities that use external communication systems, such as the public switched telephone
system, or open networks, such as the Internet, are required to safeguard protected health
information that traverses them. The specified technical security services address network risks
of message interception and interpretation by parties other than the intended recipient.
Additionally, these services protect information systems from intruders attempting to exploit
external communication points such as Internet host systems and telephone switches. In addition
to the other listed precautions, some form of encryption is required when using open networks.
Key Issues
How is relative risk determined?

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How much encryption is enough?
When should encryption be used?
Category I Guidelines-Actions must be taken to address these
If the covered entity employs an internal, private, or value-added network, the covered
entity must:
Employ alarms to sense abnormal conditions;
Enact an audit trail to recreate events in the instance of violations or compromises;
Identify and authenticate authorized users, programs, and processes;
Deny access to unauthorized users, programs, and processes;
Employ event reporting to identify operational irregularities and occurrences of
significant tasks.
If the covered entity employs the public switched telephone system, the covered entity
must:
Enact integrity controls to ensure the validity of protected health information
transmitted;
Enact message authentication to ensure that content is not altered in transmission;
Enact access controls or risk appropriate encryption to preclude unauthorized access,
interception, or interpretation.
If the covered entity employs the public Internet, the covered entity must enact the
controls listed for the public switched telephone system as well as using risk appropriate
encryption. (See Comments.)
Category II Guidelines-Actions should be taken to address these
Do not store or transmit system passwords in the clear.
Control network access through individual identification and authentication.
Employ encryption keys of the length specified by the HCFA Internet Security
Policy.
Roadblocks
Encryption is often difficult to implement. Hardware-based encryption is generally costly but
fast because it does not require CPU cycles, while software-based encryption is generally less
costly but tends to be system or application dependent and impedes performance.
Comments
Threats to data transmissions are difficult to quantify and widely misunderstood. Threat levels
vary and are sometimes based on factors such as geography. For example, the threat of
eavesdropping on the public switched telephone system within the United States is very low, but
the threat rises dramatically when international communications are considered. State-sponsored
eavesdropping is the norm in some parts of the world-particularly when U.S. interests are
involved.
In November of 1998, the Healthcare Finance Administration (HCFA) released an Internet
Security Policy describing appropriate encryption key lengths for public, private, and elliptical

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curve algorithms. Required key lengths are, of course, subject to change as technology
improves. Academic Medical Centers should use strong encryption with key lengths at least as
long as those specified by HCFA for Internet transmissions.
AMCs may need further advice from communications experts and national
agencies/organizations.